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Abstract
Carbon is certainly a hot topic in agriculture. Across the
countryside, farmers, landowners, agricultural service providers, and
many others are trying to understand what carbon is about and what
it may mean to them. One of the more interesting topics around
agricultural carbon concerns the relationship between the landowner
and tenant farmers on absentee-owned land (i.e., land that is farmed
by someone other than the person who owns it). This article provides
a brief background on the agricultural carbon opportunity and
explores some ideas about how to pursue the opportunity on
absentee-owned farmland.
I. Agricultural Carbon Primer
Almost every human endeavor – eating, driving, turning on
the lights, even breathing – generates greenhouse gases (GHG),
which in turn have been linked to climate change.1 Companies across
many economic sectors have launched ambitious efforts to reduce
their GHG emissions2 and are actively looking for solutions.
Companies are working in various ways to reduce their GHG
contributions3, including reducing their own emissions (Scope 1),
reducing emissions indirectly caused by them through, for example,
electricity consumption (Scope 2), and working with others within
their supply chains to reduce their indirect emissions (Scope 3). If
reductions are simply not possible (e.g., you can’t fly an airplane
without jet fuel), companies can purchase offset credits.4 Companies
looking for offset credits are focused almost exclusively on those


Barclay Rogers is the Vice President, Carbon Partnerships for Indigo Ag. He
holds an MBA from the University of Cambridge, an LLM from the University of
Arkansas, a JD from Lewis & Clark College, and a BS in Mechanical Engineering
from the University of Arkansas. The views expressed herein are those of the
author alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of Indigo Agriculture.
1 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2021: The
Physical Science Bias 4 (2021).
2 Ambitious Corporate Climate Action, SCI. BASED TARGETS INITIATIVE,
https://sciencebasedtargets.org/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
3 Calculation Tools, GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL,
https://ghgprotocol.org/calculationg-tools-faq (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
4 What is a Carbon Offset?, CARBON OFFSET GUIDE,
https://www.offsetguide.org/understanding-carbon-offsets/what-is-a-carbon-offset/
(last visited Mar. 13, 2022).

30

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.18

approved by recognized carbon registries like Climate Action
Reserve and Verra.5
Agriculture is uniquely positioned to make material
contributions to help address climate change. U.S. agricultural is
currently a net emitter, accounting for approximately 10% of US
GHG emissions.6 However, with a few simple changes at the fieldlevel (e.g., planting cover crops, reducing tillage, improving nitrogen
management), farms can transition from being net emitters to
“sequesters” of GHG.7 Importantly, certain farming practices –
specifically cover crops and minimal tillage – can result in the
“removal” of GHG from the atmosphere.8 Few other options exist to
remove GHG from the atmosphere, so agriculture could play a truly
meaningful role in helping to address climate change.9
Against this background on the agricultural carbon
opportunity, let’s turn to the specific question of the relationship
among the land, the landowner, and the farmer. Two things are
important with respect to agricultural carbon:
•

•

Additionality, which means that something additional
must be done on the farm to cause the GHG profile to
change in a way that more GHGs are removed, or abated,
relative to the baseline condition.
Permanence, which means that changes must remain
over a long period of time.

A practical example helps to illustrate these concepts.
Assume that a farmer went from conventional tillage practices with
no cover crops to no-till and cover crops. The cover crop is an
example of additionality because the farmer did something that he
had not done before (e.g., planted a cover crop) and that practice
5

Registries and Enforcement, CARBON OFFSET GUIDE,
https://www.offsetguide.org/understanding-carbon-offsets/carbon-offsetprograms/registries-enforcement/ (last visited June 6, 2022).
Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited
Mar. 13, 2022).
7 Id.
8 CARBON CYCLE INST., CARBON FARMING: IMPROVING SOIL FERTILITY & WATER
HOLDING CAPACITY THROUGH INCREASING SOIL CARBON 1, 2 (n.d.), available at
https://www.carboncycle.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/carbon-farmingbrochure-Sept2018-CCI-5.pdf
9 Id. at 1.
6
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changed the GHG profile (e.g., the cover crop removed CO2 from the
atmosphere through photosynthesis and stored some portion of it
below the surface in its roots). By limiting the exposure of carbon
stored in the root biomass to the atmosphere, the no-till practice
helped to ensure that the removed carbon remained stored in the soil
profile, and thus helps to establish permanence. In essence, the cover
crop is pulling carbon from the atmosphere and the soil is storing it.10
II. Carbon Farming on Leased Land
Let’s leverage this example to orient our minds around who
does what to sequester carbon in agricultural soils. The farmer is
planting the cover crop and implementing the tillage practices. But
the land itself is storing the carbon, which may be released if the soil
is disturbed in the future. If agricultural carbon is going to be
successful, the agricultural community must ensure that there are
ways to guarantee that the carbon remains stored. And as over 50%
of farmland, and sometimes upwards of 80%, of farmland used to
grow the major commodity crops in the US is absentee-owned,
appropriate incentives must be provided for landowners and tenants
alike.11
Farmers and landowners are very accustomed to working
through commercial agreements together through the land leasing
process. About 70% of the time, farmers lease land from nonoperator owners on a cash rent basis (e.g., $X per acre-year).12 Crop
share, flexible cash, or free arrangements account for the remainder
of leased acres. In essence, the farmer and the landowner reach a
decision about who is going to do what (e.g., farmer will farm the
land), who will be compensated how (e.g., farmer pays landowner a
fixed cash amount or they decide to share in the revenues or profits),
and what conditions govern the arrangement. These arrangements
have been aided by standardized land leases like the ones available
from the National Agricultural Law Center.13

10

Many farming practices may alter the GHG profile of a farm but cover crops and
reduced/no-till currently have the greatest impact in terms of sequestering carbon
in agricultural soils.
11 See DANIEL BIGELOW ET AL., ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EIB-61,
U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP, TENURE, AND TRANSFER iii (2016).
12 Id. at 28.
13 Agricultural Leases, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR.,
https://nationalaglawcenter.org/research-by-topic/ag-leases/ (last visited Mar. 13,
2022).
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Some important considerations come into focus when
thinking about carbon farming on leased land:
•
•

•
•

What is required for leased land to enter a carbon
program?
Who should earn money from the sale of any carbon
credits or other payments associated with carbon
farming?
Who should pay the costs associated with the carbon
farming practices?
What happens if a different farmer assumes control of
the leased land?

A. What Rights are Required to Enroll in a Carbon
Program?
Carbon methodologies, like the Soil Enrichment Protocol
published by the Climate Action Reserve, require the participation of
the person who has “management control over agricultural
management activities for one or more fields within the project
area.”14 This is the farmer in common parlance. The Soil
Enrichment Protocol expressly states that “[t]here is no requirement
for direct participation of the landowner. . . .”15 Tenant farmers
therefore can participate in carbon programs on leased land if they
have management rights over the farm.
B. How Should the Revenues and Costs of Carbon Farming
Be Apportioned?
Carbon revenues and costs are no different than any other
revenues and costs associated with farming.
Farmers and
landowners can split them however they desire. For example, a
farmer and landowner might agree to assign all carbon revenues to
the farmer as long as the farmer covers the costs of implementing
carbon farming practices. At the other end of the spectrum, the
farmer and landowner might agree that the landowner gets all the
carbon revenue in exchange for the landowner reducing the rent and
the farmer paying for the costs of implementing the practices. Many
other potential arrangements exist, but it’s fundamentally a
commercial decision for the landowner and farmer to reach together.

14
15

CLIMATE ACTION RSRV, SOIL ENRICHMENT 7 (2020).
Id.
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C. What Happens If Someone Else Starts Farming the Land?
The best question comes last. Recall that carbon is stored in
the soil, and that it may be released through tillage practices. Now
imagine a situation where one tenant farmer is fully committed to
carbon farming on a leased farm, but another tenant assumes control
over this farm and decides to return to a full tillage regime. In this
case, most of the carbon that was stored in the soil would be released
to the atmosphere.
The broader agricultural carbon opportunity may provide
unviable if farmers are “penalized” for implementing practices that
result in the release of carbon when farming conditions require such
intervention (e.g., tilling areas of a field that were heavily rutted
during a wet harvest period). Nevertheless, mechanisms should be
implemented to provide appropriate incentives to help maintain
carbon stored in the soil. In the case of Indigo’s carbon program, the
farmer is paid out over time, as a form of deferred compensation, to
ensure that he always has an incentive to maintain the carbon stored
in the soil.
But what happens if the farmer loses the farm, and the
subsequent tenant releases the stored carbon? The credits have been
sold to third parties on the condition that the carbon will remain
stored in the soil. How do we encourage a continuation of the carbon
farming practices, or at least discourage the release of stored carbon,
when a leased farm passes from one tenant to another?
Fortunately, this kind of situation has been addressed before
in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).16 Under CRP, farmers
remove environmentally sensitive land from agricultural production
and plant ecologically beneficial plant species in exchange for a
yearly payment.17 CRP contracts typically bind the land to the
program for 10 to 15 years.18 Under the regulations governing the
CRP program, parties who wish to remove land enrolled in the
program must “refund all or part of the payments made by CCC with
respect to the CRP contract, plus interest, and must also pay

16

About the Conservation Reserve Program, USDA,
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservationprograms/conservation-reserve-program/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
17 Id.
18 Id.
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liquidated damages as provided for in the CRP contract, if directed
to do so by CCC.”19 The regulations, however, further state that:
“If a participant transfers all or part of the right and
interest in, or right to occupancy of, land subject to
a CRP contract and the new owner or operator
becomes a successor to such contract … then such
participant will not be required to refund previous
payments received under the contract
[or]
No refunds of previous payments will be required if
the person or entity to whom all or part of the right
and interest in, or right of occupancy of, land subject
to such contract reaches an agreement with CCC to
modify the contract in a way that is consistent with
the objectives of the program.”20
In short, the CRP program does not impose any financial
penalty if the land enrolled in the program remains in the program
after a transition between owners, operators, or otherwise. USDA
has rightfully recognized that the “land” is the ultimate counterparty
to the contract and realized that the objectives remained satisfied if
the land remains in the CRP program regardless of who owns or
operates it. The CRP program is pointing the way toward a solution
to the carbon farming on leased land problem.
But let’s consider one other important element with respect
to carbon farming: the baseline. Recall that a carbon credit is
essentially a calculation of the relative GHG profile of a farm
before/after a particular farming practice is implemented. The
baseline approximates the GHG profile based on the historical
farming practices on that field before the carbon farming practices
are implemented. The baseline is usually determined based on 3 to
5 years of records for particular fields.
Now, let’s return to the leased field that moved from one
tenant farmer to another. Where is the baseline going to come from?
If the first tenant doesn’t share the baseline, or at least the data by
which it was created, with the subsequent tenant, the subsequent
tenant is effectively barred from earning carbon credits until he farms
19
20

7 C.F.R. § 1410.32 (2022).
Id.
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it long enough to establish the baseline himself (i.e., 3 to 5 years
depending on crop rotation). This is surely a suboptimal outcome,
especially if the farmer wishes to continue to carbon farm that field.
But what incentive does the initial tenant have to share the
baseline data with the subsequent tenant? As you will see in our
proposed path forward, the initial tenant and subsequent tenant could
essentially exchange the baseline for a promise to continue the
carbon farming practices. Several positive outcomes are realized
through this approach:
•
•

•

Carbon farming practices are maintained on the land, thus
eliminating potential release of carbon stored in the soil.
The initial tenant may receive any unvested carbon payments
from the carbon project developer on the condition that the
carbon farming practices are maintained on the field. The
initial tenant could enter a commercial arrangement, like the
CRP construct, via the land lease in which the subsequent
tenant agrees to refund the carbon project developer if the
carbon farming practices are terminated. This commercial
arrangement would give the carbon project developer
confidence to release unvested payments to the initial tenant.
The subsequent farmer could receive the baseline, and
underlying data, from the initial tenant and thus secure his
ability to continue to earn carbon revenue under the
previously established baseline.

Such a construct would provide aligned incentives between
tenants as well as the landowner and the carbon program
administrator. It would avoid potential value destruction – through
release of previously stored carbon or simple delays associated with
re-establishing a baseline – that may otherwise occur when different
farmers assume control of leased farmland.
III. Potential Path Forward
So how to apply these lessons to ensure that the agricultural
carbon opportunity is available on leased farmland? Here are a few
practical perspectives:
•

Farmland leases should include a provision that makes clear
that the tenant farmer has management control over the
agricultural activities on the farm, including the
implementation of carbon farming practices and the right to
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submit the necessary data to comply with agricultural carbon
programs.
Farmland leases should likewise include a provision that
establishes the revenue and cost dynamics associated with
carbon farming. Farmers and landowners need to be clear
about who is responsible for what and how they will be
compensated accordingly.
Farmland leases should have a carbon farming “transition
clause” that allows tenant farmers to agree between
themselves to exchange baseline data on the farm for a
promise to maintain carbon farming practices into the future.

Many farmers and landowners ask how to carbon farm on
leased land. The ideas, outlined herein, and a potential farmland lease
addendum, included as an exhibit below, is an effort to outline a path
forward.21
IV. Exhibit: Farmland Lease Addendum
This Addendum supplements the rights and obligations
associated with the land described in the Farmland Lease between
[Owner] and [Operator] executed on [Date]) (“Effective Date”)
relative to the following land: [Legal Description] (“Land”). Owner
and Operator are collectively referred to as Parties.
1. The Land is enrolled in the following agricultural carbon
program: [Name of Program] (“Carbon Program”)
administered by [Name of Carbon Program Administrator]
(“Carbon Program Administrator”). Owner confirms that
Operator has management control over the Land to a degree
sufficient for the Operator to participate in the Carbon Program.
2. Owner and Operator agree to share revenues and costs associated
with the Carbon Program as follows:

Operator
Owner

21

Revenue
Costs
__________% __________%
__________% __________%

It is ultimately the responsibility of the farmland owner or manager to establish a
lease with this tenant that is acceptable to both parties, and this article or exhibit is
not intended to be final language or represent legal advice of any nature by the
author. The exhibit is a basic template intended to communicate the ideas outlined
in this article.
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In the event that Owner has agreed to share in the Revenues or
Costs, Operator agrees to account to Owner the Revenue and
Costs associated with the Carbon Program by no later than
[Date].
3. The following provisions are applicable if the Land was enrolled
Carbon Program before the Effective Date:
A.

Has Operator received the data from [Yes / No]
[Name of former tenant] (“Former
Tenant”) necessary to establish by, or
continue following, the Effective Date the
baseline for the Land in the Carbon
Program?

B.

Does Operator agree to maintain the [Yes / No]
carbon farming practices and to share the
necessary data as required by the Carbon
Program during the term of this Farmland
Lease?

C.

Does Operator agree to reimburse the [Yes / No]
Carbon Program Administrator for any
losses of carbon to the atmosphere if
Operator discontinues carbon farming
practices or fails to share the necessary Amount:
data as required by the Carbon Program $_________
during the term of this Farmland Lease?
If so, please specify the amount that
Operator agrees to pay Carbon Program
Administrator
upon
delivery
of
reasonable
evidence
demonstrating
failure to maintain carbon farming
practices and/or to share the necessary
data as required by the Carbon Program.

